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Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri: Hybrid Political Theory in the Delhi Sultanate

(Perso-Islamic and Endogenous Traditions of Statecraft in India)

Seyed Hossein Zarhani

Introduction

The name and works of Ziyā al-Din Barani or Ziyā Barani (ca. 1285–1357 CE) – one of the most influential historians and political thinkers in medieval India – are barely known among mainstream political theory scholars. Scholars of Indian history are mainly familiar with his *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* (History of Firuz Shāh) that deals with life and time of Delhi Sultans from Ghiyāth al-Din Balban (1266–1287 CE) to Firuz Shāh (1354–70 CE).[1] J. Mehta describes Ziyā Barani as the 'greatest of all contemporary historians of early medieval India'.[2]

While *Tarikh* had been published by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan[3] in the 19th century; *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* – Barani's outstanding work on politics – remained unknown until the middle of 20th century. Even after the discovery of the manuscript and the first translation into English by Afsar Salim Khan (1972), *Fatāwā* has generally been ignored or marginalised by political scientists in India, Pakistan and Iran. For example, in the recent *Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*[4] there is no entry for Ziyā Barani or his *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri*. This book can be classified as an example of 'Mirror for Prince'

or 'Fürstenspiegel' genre. *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* is only of Indo-Persian work that is exclusively devoted to political theory during the era of the Delhi Sultanate. In contrast to *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi,* Ziyā Barani does not address historical figures or events of Delhi Sultanate in the *Fatāwā*. He wrote *Fatāwā* with a clear intention of instructing Muslim rulers (Pādeshāhān-e Islam) in the art of governance and statecraft. Irfan Habib[5] translated the work's title as 'Opinions on Government', N. Sarkar[6] as 'Decrees on ordering the governed world' and the Encyclopedia Britannica (2015) as 'Rulings on Temporal Government'.

Among the few academic works on *Fatāwā*, there is not only no consensus about the main elements of Barani's concept of politics, but also the interpretations of his work are conflicting and contradictory. For Instance, Varma[7] portrays Barani as a fanatical protagonist of Islam who recommended an all-out struggle against Hinduism. He depicts Barani as a fundamentalist promoting a "religiously militant administration based on dogmatic fanatism". Varma also claims that Barani was a supporter of an aristocracy of religious elites. In contrast, M. Habib and Khan (1961) introduce Barani as the first theoretician who justifies the secular law among Mussalmans. Similarly, Black (2011) describes Barani as an exceptional scholar in seeing a direct opposition between religion and politics. According to Black, "Barani's argument rotates around a clear distinction between state policy and personal morality."[8] Likewise, as I.A. Khan[9] specifies that *Fatāwā* enables us to understand the secular character of the Delhi Sultanate. Quoting Muhammad Habib, Khan (1986) states that *Fatāwā* demonstrates that the Delhi Sultanate was "not a theocratic state in any sense of the word. Its basis was not *Sharia* of Islam, but the *Zawābet* or State laws made by the king." However, Muzaffar Alam rejects the role of Barani as first Muslim thinker who justifies the secular law and writes, "This assessment seems to me anachronistic."[10]

In the same way, there is a debate about the fundamental values that had a direct impact on the *Fatawā*. Roy and Alam[11] note that Barani has been perceived as "conservative, a fundamentalist and a bigot" by some scholars since he was a *Sharia*-minded scholar, who had a hostile view toward the Hindus. In contrast, the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2015) asserts that *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* is influenced by Sufi mysticism and Barani "expounded a religious philosophy of history that viewed the events in the lives of great men as manifestations of divine providence."

In view of the contradictory interpretations of Barani's political ideas in his *Fatāwā,* the primary aim of this study is to explore the following questions:

(1) What are the essential elements of Barani's political thought?

(2) Which political, cultural and social background factors influenced *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* and Barani's political theory?

(3) What is the influence of a) Islamic political ideas, b) pre-Islamic Iranian political ideas, and c) ancient Indian tradition of statecraft, as articulated by Kauṭilya, on Barani's political thought?

Reviewing the Literature

As mentioned above, before the 1940s, Barani was known only for his *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* (History of Firuz Shāh). That changed when a complete manuscript of *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* was discovered and identified by A. Habibullah[12] in the Oriental and India Office Collections, London. The manuscript had originally belonged to Tipu Sultan Library in Mysore, from where it was transferred to London. Due to the fact that last three digits of the date of transcription are 115 (based on Islamic Hijri calendar), Salim Khan[13] concludes that the manuscript was copied from an older version during the 18th century. However, so far, no other copies have been identified. In the last sentence of the introduction of the *Fatāwā*, the author introduces himself as a 'well-wisher of the Sultan's Court, Ziyā Barani'.[14]

As Hardy notes,[15] in the aftermath of partition and the establishment of independent India and Pakistan, intense interest in studying traditions of Muslim political thought in South Asia developed. That interest was connected to questions like the relation between secular law and *Sharia*, citizenship, and Hindu-Muslim relations. Under the supervision of Peter Hardy at London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Afsar Salim Khan wrote a Ph.D. thesis on Ziyā Barani's political ideas and translated some parts of the *Fatāwā* to English. She published an abridged translation of *Fatāwā* in the *Medieval India Quarterly* (1957). Mohammad Habib combined this translation with an introduction and epilogue which was published in the same journal in 1958. In their *The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate,* M. Habib and A.S. Khan (1961) translated additional parts of *Fatāwā* to English and wrote a new introduction to Barani's political ideas. This book introduced *Fatāwā* to English-speaking scholars.

However, only in 1972, was the full text of *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* translated into English by Afsar Salim Khan, who had become a professor and head of the department of political science at Peshawar University. Due the fact that there are several omissions and inaccuracies in the English translations, our study also draws on the original Persian text that was published along with the English translation and the introduction of Afsar Salim Khan (1972).

Following this 1972 translation, Barani's *Fatāwā* attracted growing attention among scholars. Hardy (1978) compared and analysed Ziyā Barani's

thinking on government in the *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* with other eminent Muslim scholars like al-Ghazāli and his *Nasihat al-Moluk*, or Nasir al-Din Tusi and his *Akhlāq-e Naseri*. Irfan Habib (1999) tried to illustrate Ziyā Barani's major ideas on the nature, objectives, and functions of the state. Sarkar (2006) concentrated on the Barani's employment of the 'voice' of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni in the *Fatāwā* as the main adviser to rulers. Sarkar (2011) also focused on the exercise of government in the capital city (dār al-Molk) provided by Barani. Black (2011) concentrated on the relations between morality and politics in *Fatāwā*. Muzaffar Alam[16] discussed the essential difference of Barani with his predecessors in Muslim space like al-Ghazāli or Nezām al-Molk Tusi as well as his contemporaries in India.

In addition, some scholars compared Barani and his *Fatāwā* with non-Muslim political thinkers. For example, Arbind Das (1996) compared Kauṭilya's *Arthashastra with* Barani's *Fatāwā*. He tried to analyse and compare the two Indian 'Mirrors for Princes' texts in their different historical, cultural and social contexts, with reference to categories such as the theory of kingship, sovereignty, administration, justice or financial organisation. Unfortunately, Das remains silent about the conceivable causes of the considerable similarities between two works and does not thematise the possible continuity of the Kauṭilyan tradition of statecraft in India's political history.

Similarly, Syros (2012) compared Barani's *Fatāwā* and Machiavelli's *The Prince* and underlined the significance of Barani's political ideas from a cross-cultural perspective. Barani and Machiavelli are separated by time and space and lived and wrote in two different political, cultural, and social contexts. However, Syros (2012) acknowledges that there are certain similarities between key ideas of these two writers. He states that Barani's ideas like the pessimistic image of human nature, the distinction between personal morality and politics, the ruler's exposure to various threats, the origins, mechanics, and purpose of government and the ruler's authority during emergencies "bring him peculiarly close to Machiavelli".[17]

Ziyā Barani's Life and Socio-Political Background

Ziyā al-Din ibn Mo'ayyed al-Molk Barani was born in 1285 CE, most probably at Baran (modern Bulandshahr in U.P., southeast of Delhi). He grew up in an India where a century had passed since the establishment of Delhi Sultanate by Persianised Turk Sultans adhering to the Sunni Muslim religion. His birth was coinciding with last years of the reign of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (1266-1287 CE).

Irfan Habib[18] presents Barani's family background as one of scholars and administrative officials. Hardy[19] notes that Barani was related by descent and

marriage to "middle-ranking Muslim service families". According to J. Mehta,[20] Barani belonged to a Turk aristocratic family that settled in India in the first phase of Turk immigration to India. His father Mo'ayyed al-Molk was *Nayib* (Deputy) of Arkali Khan, son of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Din Balban. An uncle of Barani was *kutwāl* (police chief) of Delhi.[21]

Barani himself writes: "The father of this weak individual was a noble (*Sharif*) and my grandmother was a *Syed* [title of descendants of Prophet Mohammad] who performed some miracles."[22] Not only was his father (who had the title of Mo'ayyed al-Molk) *Nayib* (Deputy) of Balban's son Arkali Khan, but also his mother's father Sipahsalar Hisam al-Din was *Hajib* (Chamberlain) of Sultan Balban.[23] Moreover, during the reign of *Khilji* dynasty, Ziyā's father was appointed *Khawaja* (governor) of Baran.

However, Ziyā Barani does not talk about his grandfather (father's father), his name and his job. So it is clear that his father was not a Syed. Moreover, Mo'ayyed al-Molk seems a royal title rather than a real name. Although most of the contemporary historical works presented him as a member of the Turk aristocracy, Barani himself writes he is Indian. Thus, Barani's family background remains opaque for us.[24]

Barani's life and his political ideas were influenced by drastic political and social changes that came in the aftermath of the Mongol invasions of Central, Western, and South Asia. He was born six decades after Mongol invasion of *Khārazm* and *Khorasan* from 1219 to 1221 CE and thirty years after Siege of Baghdad (1258) and Collapse of Abbasid Caliphate. These attacks in many ways impacted the Delhi Sultanate.

Delhi, Mongol Invasion and Indo-Persian Culture

The first consequence of the Mongol invasions is the spreading of Persian language and culture into the North of the Indian sub-continent. As Mohammad Habib notes,[25] India acquired a unique position in Islamic world after Mongol invasion of Central and West Asia (during 13th and 14th centuries) as it was "the only country where *Ajam* culture could flourish". As Bosworth (1984) and Gould (2015) explain, in medieval Arabic literature, *Ajam* [derived from the Arabic root referencing muteness] was the name given to the non-Arabs who lived in Islamic space. *Ajam* applied particularly to Persians. In the early centuries of Islam, the ability to speak Arabic was the main criteria for differentiating Arabs and *Ajam*. Thus, *Ajam* connoted the supremacy of Arabs over 'mute' non-Arabs and consequently had a negative connotation. However, with the rise of Persians in the Caliphate and the revival of Persian culture and language, *Ajam* became a basic ethnic and geographical designation that was a synonym to Persian.

We must add here that *Ajam* culture migrated to India not just as a consequence of Mongol Invasion to Central and West Asia, but, from the 11th century CE onward it was introduced by Turk Sultans who invaded India. Muzaffar Alam, Delvoye, and Gaborieau[26] in *The Making of Indo-Persian Culture* noted that although some of the Turkish Sultans and the ruling families used Turkish as the spoken language, Turk culture never found traction in India. On the other hand, the Turk rulers were steeped in Persian culture. The roots of Indo-Persian culture can be traced to Ghaznavid dynasty that was based in Ghazni in today's Afghanistan. Persian was introduced to India by Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavid, who several times invaded the northwest of the subcontinent and occupied Punjab in 1020 CE.[27] According to Muzaffar Alam,[28] during the 11th century, the new Persian literary culture from Ghazni flowed to Lahore and northern India.

However, Muzaffar Alam et al.[29] specifiy that the maturation phase of Indo-Persian culture took place in the framework of Delhi Sultanate under rule of Persianised Turkish or Afghan dynasties in 13th and 14th centuries such as Mamluk dynasty (1206-1290 CE), the Khilji dynasty (1290-1320 CE), the Tughlaq dynasty (1320-1414 CE), the Sayyed dynasty (1414-1451 CE) and the Lodi dynasty (1451-1526 CE). Although most of these dynasties were not ethnically Persian, they were promoters of *Ajam* culture and Persian literature. Therefore, Persian language and culture flourished under the rule of these dynasties and, as Gould indicates,[30] Persian literature was developed mostly by poets who were not native Persian speakers. Gradually, Persian language and culture became an integral part of the South Asian culture, especially in northern India. More importantly, as Muzaffar Alam (2003) elaborates, because of this cultural flow, northern India became part of Perso-Islamic cultural space. For the *Ajam* cultural world, Delhi and Lahore attained a position and importance comparable to Bukhara, Nishapur, Isfahan, Shiraz, or Herat.

Gould[31] describes *Ajam* as a highly cohesive social, political and cultural configuration within the horizons of the medieval eastern Islamic world. Alam also concentrated on the issues of identity and wrote:

> In the thirteenth century, there was a certain degree of cultural integration with a coherent Perso-Islamic identity (in opposition to the Arab culture) that is identified with the term *Ajam*. The Persian-speaking residents of Delhi and Lahore seem to have considered themselves a part of this world of *Ajam*.[32]

However, Chengis Khan's invasion to the Perso-Islamic world and the subsequent waves of Mongol invasions led to a considerable Persian elite emigration to northern India, which enhanced the role and position of Persian language and culture in India. One of the early manifestations of the emergence of *Ajam* identity and its new imagined territory can be traced in *Lobāb al-*

Albāb (The Essence of Wisdom) that was the first major *Tazkereh* (critical anthology) of Persian poetry.[33] The author of this anthology, Mohammad Awfi (1171-1242 CE), originally was from Bukhara (in today's Uzbekistan) and emigrated to India after Chengis Khan's invasion. Awfi not only considered Persian poets from what is today's Iran as *Ajam*, but also included Abul Faraj-e Runi and Mas'ud Sa'ad Salmān from Lahore, and Nezāmi of Ganja and Khāqāni of Shirvan (both from today's Azerbaijan) as *Ajam* poets.[34]

Awfi was not the only *Ajam* scholar who settled in India. According to historical sources, Delhi in the 14th century CE saw a massive influx of Persian-speaking elites: princes, scholars, merchants, Sufi saints, craftsmen, penmen. For example, Mohammad Qasem Hendushāh-e Astarābādi in his *Tārikh-e Fereshteh* highlighted this migration, writing:

> The kings and princes – who had migrated to India during the reign of previous Sultans – arrived in Delhi during the reign of Ghiyās al-Din Balban [1266–1287]. They were fifteen princes from Turkistan and Transoxiana, Khorasan, Iraq-e Arab, Iraq-e Ajam, Azerbaijan, Sham, and Rome that escaped from Chengis Khan's aggression…Elites such as swordsmen, writers, singers, craftsmen, and artists from every part of the globe gathered in his [Ghiyās al-Din Balban's] court. Most of the Ulama, scholars, Sufi Sheikhs and poets, Amir Khosrow [Dehlavi] was their chairperson, gathered at his son's house.[35]

Not only did these migrant elites influenced the language of the court in Delhi, but also they introduced various Persian scholarly works and poetry. Barani in his *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* illustrated how much *Ajam* culture and Persian poetry was dominant in the court:

> Sultan Mohammad [son of Sultan Balban] had an assembly that comprised from the wise people, scholars, and artists. His [Muhammad Sultan's] companions used to read (to him) the Shāh-Namah, the Divan-e-Sanāyi, the Divan-e -Khāqāni, and the Khamseh-ye Nezāmi. Learned men discussed the merits of these poets in his presence. Amir Khosrow [famous Indian poet] and Amir Hasan were servants at his court.[36]

The migrants who came from Khorasan, Iraq-e Ajam, Azerbaijan and other parts of the *Ajam* world brought the legacy of *Ajam* science, arts, culture, and politics. Although, their home cities like Samarqand, Bukhara, Herat, Tus, Neyshabur, and later Baghdad were devastated by Mongols, Delhi, and its Sultans provided a safe environment for the growth of *Ajam* culture. These developments led to the emergence of new elites (Indian, Turk or Persian) that were highly Persianised. The *Ajam* traditions of these elites were most deeply rooted in northern India.

Ghiyāth al-Din Balban lost his son Mohammad during fighting the Mongols and died in 1287 CE. After Balban's death, his successors could not sustain the dynasty, and later *Khilji* Turks became new Sultans of Delhi. Nevertheless, the

Persian-speaking elites kept their bureaucratic and administrative positions. Ziyā Barani and his family belonged to this elite class and its social status provided an opportunity for his proper education. He had extensive training in Arabic and Persian. Also, he was well-trained in Muslim theology and deeply read in history. After learning Quran and the alphabet, he continued the education during the reign of Alauddin, the new *Khilji* king. In his *Tārikh*,[37] Barani describes the intellectual life of Delhi during the reign of Alauddin with its superb teachers and scholars whose intellectual calibre was "not to be found in Bokhara, or Samarqand, Damascus, Tabriz, Isfahan or in any part of the world...they were equals of Ghazāli and Rāzi." As Barani mentioned,[38] he was a pupil of some of these teachers. He read and studied "several books of ancient and later times in every branch of knowledge", and claimed, "after Tafsir (Quranic commentary), Hadith (Prophet Mohammad's tradition), Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and Tariqat of Sheikhs (Sufism), I have found no science so useful as the science of History."[39] However, Barani had no training in philosophy and this ignorance of philosophy is reflected in his works when he criticises Muslims engaging in philosophy.

During his education, he also was profoundly influenced by Islamic mysticism and Sufi tradition. Later, he became a disciple and friend of Nizām al-Din Awliyā, a famous Sufi Sheikh. Ziyā Barani also had a close relation with the two Indian Persian-speaking poets Amir Khosrow Dehlavi and Amir Hasan Dehlavi.[40]

This privileged background in social status and education enabled Barani to find a job in the court of new Sultan of Delhi, Mohammad ibn Tughlaq (ca. 1300-1351 CE). When Barani was in his fifties, he was appointed as the *Nadim* (boon companion) of the Sultan. It was an important position and, as a major courtier, he had access to power, wealth, and information. Since he accompanied the Sultan on several occasions and had access to information via his observations or another courtier, his *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* depicts a clear image of Delhi Sultanate and power relations in the court.

After Mohammad ibn Tughlaq's death, along with other courtiers, Barani participated in a plan to install his minor son, on the throne. However, Firuz Shāh, who was a cousin of Mohammad ibn Tughlaq, finally became new Sultan. Therefore, Ziyā Barani lost his job and became marginalised and impoverished. Barani wrote his major works *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* and *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* after his dismissal. For his *Tārikh-e Firuz Shāhi* used the name of the new Sultan, hoping to find a way back to the court of *Firuz Shāh*. But his attempts were not successful, and he did not dedicate *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* to any other ruler. Finally, he died in poverty and loneliness around 1357 CE.

Fatāwā-ye Jahāndāri: A Mirror for Muslim Princes Text

Darling[41] defines Mirrors for Princes as "works reflecting the ideal ruler or giving advice on governance for a current or future king or minister, [that] constitute a well known literary tradition in both Europe and the Middle East." As a popular genre from the ancient era to the Renaissance, in different cultural and social contexts, Mirrors for Princes offer advice and guidance to kings, princes, viziers, and other high-ranking officials. While the European mirrors for princes (Machiavelli's *The Prince* in particular) have been widely studied, non-Western Mirrors for Princes are mostly marginalised by the mainstream of Political Science.

Some authors view Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* as one of the oldest examples of Mirrors for Princes. Even though the *Arthaśāstra* is a genuinely scholarly work with high theoretical and methodological standards, it clearly does also have an instructional dimension.[42] For sure, the ancient Indian beast fables *Panchatantra* – probably older than the *Arthaśāstra* – do belong to the Mirror for Princes genre.

In pre-Islamic Persia (mainly during Sassanid dynasty[43]), works like *Javidan Kherad* (Eternal wisdom), *Name-ye Tansar* (Letter of Tansar), or *Ahd-i Ardashīr* (Ardashīr's Testament) are examples of the Mirror for Princes tradition. These mirrors belong to a pre-Islamic literary genre known as *Andarz* that offered advice on proper behaviour, religion and statecraft.[44] These works originally were written in Pahlavi, however, as Haghighat notes,[45] scholars of pre-Islamic mirrors are faced with the fact that these mirrors for princes are available in manuscripts that were copied after the Islamisation of Persia, or can be found in the Arabic books that contain some translated part of original texts. These kinds of mirrors were translated into Arabic in the first centuries after Islam by translators like Ibn al-Muqaffa (died c. 756 CE). One of most remarkable examples of Ibn al-Muqaffa's work is a translation of *Kalileh va Demneh* from Pahlavi to Arabic. According to Persian traditions, the Sanskrit *Panchatantra* was translated into Pahlavi during the reign of Khosrow I Anoširvān (531-579 CE). Naṣrullah Munshi translated *Kalileh va Demneh* into new Persian in the twelfth century CE. In the Islamic era, especially in *Ajam* cultural space, the mirror genre emerged in new Persian with a designation like *Andarz* (counsel), *Pand* (maxim), *Nasihat* (advice), and *Wasaya* (instruction), *Maw'ezeh* (exhortation) or *Hikmat* (wisdom, proverb).[46]

In the late eleventh century CE, Kaykāvus ibn Iskandar wrote *Qābus-nāmeh* the first known mirror for princes in new Persian. According to its introduction, *Qābus-nāmeh* was written as a book of advice (*ketāb-e pandhā*) for Kaykāvus' son and successor, Gilānshāh. Soon thereafter, *Siyāsat nāmeh* (The Book of Politics) that was written by Nezām al-Molk-e Tusi (1018-1092 CE) who was

the grand vizier of two Turk-Seljuk sultans is commonly recognised as the most outstanding example of the medieval Persian Mirrors for Prince genre. *Siyāsat nāmeh* also known as the *Siyar al-moluk* (The conduct of kings) was manual for a new and inexperienced Sultan based on the pre-Islamic Persian tradition of statecraft typified by the conduct of ancient Persian kings of the Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties.

Scholars like Aquil[47] claim that *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* is not really an example of the Mirror for Prince genre because Barani expressed his political ideas with reference to the history of the Delhi Sultanate; nonetheless, Aquil's study tries to shed light on the normative values and theoretical substance of the *Fatāwā*. Muzaffar Alam (2000) differentiated between two distinct types of Indo-Islamic political treatises that had an immense influence on (Muslim) politics in pre-colonial India: The first is *Adab* that addressed right (political) conduct and the second is concerned with *Akhlāq* (moral qualities). The *Fatāwā* can be seen as a variant of the *Adab* genre that stands in the tradition of *Siyāsat nāmeh.* Affirming that, *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* – like the *Arthaśāstra* or *Siyāsat-nāmeh* – is no historical-descriptive text, but it is a theoretical work that also offers practical advice in statecraft.

After reviewing the form and structure of *Fatāwā,* it can be concluded that it was influenced by Nezām al-Molk's *Siyāsat nāmeh.* After a short introduction, *Fatāwā* has twenty-four chapters, albeit named *Nasihat* (advice). In each chapter, after the core thesis as advice, narratives of historical events are presented for illustration and further elaboration. Such anecdotes are mainly about ancient Persian kings, the first four pious caliphs, Abbasid caliphs, other Muslim sultans as well as Alexander the Great, Plato, and Aristotle.

Despite the fact that most of the mirror literature were written for a specific king or vizier, Barani wrote *Fatāwā* as an instruction for (Islamic) rulers in general – his dedication to Firuz Shāh in the title notwithstanding.

Barani's Political Theory in *Fatāwā*

(a) The Conception of Kingship

Although *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* was written in India, it cannot be adequately analysed without an eye to main trends in Islamic political thoughts in other parts of Islamic geo-culture. Rosenthal[48] distinguished three main trends in the medieval Islamic political ideas. The first trend concentrated on *Sharia* and the idea of the *Khilafat* (Caliphate), and it was mainly developed by Sunni jurists. Māwardi (972-1058 CE) in his *Ahkam al-Sultaniya* assumed that the *Khalifa* (Caliph) is superior over the *Umma* based on the *Sharia*. In the second trend, Muslim political philosophers like Al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes in

their *Falsifa* (Philosophy), are strongly influenced not only by *Sharia* but also by the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. In the third trend, the Mirrors for Princes genre offers advice to rulers with a more practical orientation on statecraft as opposed to political jurisprudence and political philosophy. It should be noted here that most of the medieval mirrors for princes in Islamic geo-culture were written in Persian while the majority of philosophical-theological and jurisprudential works were in Arabic.

Tabatabai[49] perceived medieval Persian texts like *Siyāsat nāmeh* as a 'continuation' of pre-Islamic Iranian mirrors for princes that articulate the '*Iranshahri*' (or '*Iranopolis*') tradition of statecraft and Persian kingship. Tabatabai sees in *Iranshahri* thought a consistent pattern of thinking in Sassanid Iran about politics and statecraft, centered on the notion of kingship. *Iranshahri* ideas rotate around key concepts such as the ideal king with *Farrah* (divine authority), the relationships between politics and religion, social strata and justice.

On the other hand, Haghighat[50] recognises the influence on new Persian mirrors by the pre-Islamic Sassanid mirrors but also sees specificities in the new Persian mirrors that were determined by their historical contexts in Islamic Persia.

Most remarkably, Persian was the only language in which mirrors for princes were written in the Islamic world, and this literature emerged in Persia or what we may call the '*Ajam* world'. That is why Tabatabai[51] asserts that the political discourse of mirror for princes that emerged in Islamic period of Persia (or *Ajam* geo-culture) "cannot be considered as a component of so-called Islamic political thoughts." Therefore, these mirrors should be seen as evolved forms of Sassanid political ideas that were written in Pahlavi, but within a new Islamic context.

Tabatabai[52] mostly focused on *Siyāsat nāmeh* as the prime example of the continuity of pre-Islamic Persian political ideas. However, he is unfamiliar with next generation of Persian mirrors for princes that had not been written in Persia, but in India. It seems that *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* was strongly influenced by political works that were written in *Ajam* geo-culture such as *Siyāsat nāmeh.* However, it goes beyond the mere imitation of earlier works.

Siyāsat nāmeh as well as *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* are rooted in pre-Islamic Sassanid advice literature, but reflect the social and political changes in an Islamic context. In spite of some references to Islam, the Quran, the Hadith and the records of the caliphs, this theory of kingship remains fundamentally alien to the caliphate concept.

As Daryayi shows,[53] *Shāhanshāh* (King of Kings) was the head of Sassanid Empire in Persia. Early Sassanid kings were considered as divine. *Shāhanshāh*

was not an ordinary creature and should be respected and obeyed as a divine. According to Daryayi,[54] after further development of Zoroastrian theology, the Sassanian *Shāhanshāh* gradually took on more sacred duties. Like *Ohrmazd* (the Zoroastrian God) who fights chaos in the cosmos, the Shāhanshāh should fight chaos and bring back order to the earth. So "through the order, the well-being of the people was secured and this well-being only feasible through the dispensation of justice by the king." In the context of the pre-Islamic Iranian notion of kingship, *Farrah* is a divine light and can be considered as divine authority, which empowers the king to rule over an empire. Anyone who has *Farrah-e izadi* (God's Grace), "would have the right to succeed or accede to the throne, and his rule would, therefore, be regarded as legitimate".[55] Therefore, according to the notion of kingship in *Iranshahri* tradition, it was assumed that *Shāhanshāh* received his right to rule as a gift from God (*Ohrmazd* or *Ahuramazda*). *Farrah* is a singular privilege which enables him to rule. However, *Farrah* is not a reason for claiming divinity as such. If the *Shāhanshāh* proclaimed outright his divinity or were unjust towards the people, particularly by being unable to maintain peace and stability, he would lose the *Farrah-ye izadi*. Not only in most of pre-Islamic Pahlavi sources and the new Persian *Shahnameh,* is this notion of kingship manifest, but also in the Sassanid artifact *Naqsh-e Rostam,* which depicts Ardeshir (the first Sassanid *Shāhanshāh*) receiving the *Farrah* from Ahuramazda. *Farrah* is symbolised in what looks like a roll of a *Farman* (charter). A stone inscription above Ardeshir's horse states in three languages, "Ardeshir is *Shāhanshāh* (King of Kings) of Iran who is blessed by God. (He is) the son of Bābak Shāh".[56]

Interestingly, several centuries later, Nezām al-Molk – a very strict Sunni and founder of *Nezāmiyeh Madrasah* system for teaching Sunni Islam jurisprudence – dropped the Sunni theory of Caliphate. Instead, under the influence of Sassanid theory of kingship, he adopted the concept of the 'King with the God's grace'. This conceptualisation of kingship clearly differs from the model of *Khilafat* (Caliphate) in Sunni Islam orthodoxy. Nezām al-Molk, at the beginning of *Siyāsat nāmeh* states:

> In every age and time, God (be He exalted) chooses one member of human race, and, having endowed him with godly and kingly virtue, entrusts him with the interests of the world and well-being of His servants. He charges that person to close the doors of corruption, confusion, and discord.[57]

Ziyā Barani too was a very a strict Sunni Muslim. Nevertheless, he also adopted the pre-Islamic notion of kingship (Padishah) without any emphasis on the *Sharia*-based concept of Caliphate. Barani in the first phrase of the first advice writes:

> Padishah is the wonderful creature of Allah (be He exalted).[58]

Comparing *Siyāsat nāmeh* and *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri*, similar phrases can be identified:

> Almighty God selected Padishah among all other creatures and gave him all glories and greatness of the world.[59]

Like earlier works of pre-Islamic advice literature, Ziyā Barani described King as someone who has God's grace, but no personal divinity:

> As Sultan Mahmud said: O my sons and the kings of Islam! You should know it, and remember it! Kingship is one of the greatest affairs of the world. Because, an individual who was equal with other people in terms of creation, mentality, appearance, and needs is designated by God and he becomes superior and all other sons of Adam are his subjects.[60]

It seems that Ziyā Barani's concentration on the kingship as a political institution has an objective historical background. Nezām al-Molk tried to establish a centralised empire in a divided territory that was under the control of several Khans and tribes. Transformation of the Turk-Seljuk Sultanate into an integrated empire with a centralised administration like Sassanid Persia was Nezām al-Molk's strategic goal. Similarly, Ziyā Barani sought to cope with the political difficulties for Sunni Muslim rulers after the collapse of Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. In its early stage, the Caliph as the deputy of the Prophet (not God) symbolised the religious and political unity in the Muslim world. At the beginning of Islam, the Caliph actually possessed dual – pontifex maximus-like – powers and was considered as the temporal and spiritual leader. However, after the rise of the Turk sultanate in the Islamic world, the caliph's temporal power decreased and was limited to Baghdad. Differentiating between authority and power, Makdisi elaborated Caliph-Sultan relations in the 11th century:

> It was the force of attraction between authority and power which brought into conflict the interests of the Caliph and Sultan. In the golden age of the Caliphate, the Caliph possessed both authority and power. When power slipped from the Caliph's hands, the struggle began between him and the holder of power. But the Sultan was always at a disadvantage, for he always was in need of being legitimised; hence his struggle to achieve stability through a reintegration of power and authority to his own advantage.[61]

Scholars such as Ghazāli suggested and formulated the new form of power relations in the Islamic world. Whereas Ghazāli recognised the secular authority of Turk Sultans, he suggested they should formally acknowledge the caliph's legitimacy and symbolically offer him their allegiance. So, the secular Turkish sultans held power, although their moral and religious legitimacy could only be provided by the caliph.[62]

With the collapse of Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, the question of moral and religious authority for Sunni Turkish kings had to be addressed. Political instability in Delhi and rise and fall of diverse dynasties in a short period of time can be perceived as the consequence of the collapse of the foundation of political legitimacy in the Islamic world. That is why the Sultan of Delhi, Mohammad ibn Tughlaq, who was faced with various political rivals, found a survivor of Abbasid family in Egypt and offered him his allegiance as the Caliph.[63]

In contrast, Ziyā Barani – even though he was a Sunni Muslim – never theorised Sultan-Caliph relations and preferred to shape his advice with an eye to the pre-Islamic Iranian notion of kingship. In this perspective, the king was considered as the 'shadow' of God on the earth endued with *Farrah.*

Anarchy, Order, and Justice

Ziyā Barani in *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri*, like Nezām al-Molk and Kauṭilya, considered monarchy as the universal form of government. Nevertheless, Barani's theory of kingship was not limited to *Farrah* notion. He elaborated the concept of kingship with reference to justice and anarchy. The concept of 'justice equals order' was widespread in the pre-Islamic mirrors and *Ajam* literature. However, Barani's conceptualisation of justice and anarchy is closely related to the *Arthaśāstra* in ancient India.

While, Kauṭilya, and Barani are separated in time and political and cultural context, there is some remarkable resemblance between their notions of kingship. Kauṭilya at the beginning of the *Arthaśāstra* introduced basic anthropological features underlying politics. The man is driven by instincts and affects: "lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance, and foolhardiness".[64] Since, human beings constantly get in conflicts of interests with each other, this anthropological features lead to a pristine situation of anarchy among human beings: the condition of *mātsya-nyāya* (big fish devour smaller fish). Men, fearing for their life and property, decide to install a king who can enforce order and end violent anarchy.[65] Similarly, Ziyā Barani[66] submits his view of the fundamental anthropological features of man at the beginning of the first advice of *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri*:

> Jealousy, greed, anger, hatred, and evil are inhered within the nature of human beings.

While Barani exempts Prophets, *Awliya* (plural form of Wail, literally means custodian, and Sufi saints or masters in the Sufi context), and people guided by eternal providence, he asserted that anger, greed, and Jealousy are central features of majority of human beings' anthropological constitution.[67] In the fifth advice, he described the condition of anarchy (*Harj va marj*) in which the

"oppressors, dominants, unrulies, usurpers, looters, deniers of the day of Judgment violate the property and family of the weak, obedient and helpless people and orphans".[68] For enforcing order (*Intizam*), justice (*adl*) is needed. He defined justice (*adl*) as the antonym of anarchy. According to Barani,[69] establishing justice is the fundamental reason for the supremacy, prestige, and power of kings. The power of the king is necessary to end the condition of anarchy.

Citing a Quranic verse [51:56], Barani argues that the purpose of creation of human beings and *Jinns* ('demons') is the worship of God. In Islamic conception, the Arabic term of *Ebadat* (worship) literally means to be servant or slave. Being a servant of God (*bandagi* in Persian) is attributed to characteristics such as weakness and imperfection relative to God, modesty, humbleness, and obeisance, whereas the necessary attributes of a king – pride, dignity, eminence, and grandeur – are the opposites of those required for devotional servitude. However, these necessary characteristics of kings are essential to ending anarchy, enforcing order and establishment of justice.[70] Such explicit differentiation between personal morality and kings' morality cannot be found in previous Persian or Islamic works on politics. Of course, some schools of Islamic thought based on the concept of *Masliah* (beneficence) in the condition of *force majeure* permitted the short-term abandonment of some rules of *Sharia*, nevertheless highlighting and acknowledging dual morality is an innovative and revolutionary feature of Barani's thought – but one that is consistent with Kauṭilyan political thought.

Question of the Link between Religion and Politics

Edward Gibbon (1737-1794 CE), famous English historian, in his *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, wrote, "Mohammad (d. 632 CE), with the sword in one hand and the Quran in the other, erected his throne on the ruins of Christianity and of Rome".[71] This image cannot be generalised to Muslim polity in all ages and times. However, the age of Mohammad and what Sunni Muslims call it as the age of the rightly-guided caliphs (632-661 CE) played a significant role in the construction of the notion of politics and religion among Sunni Muslims. In the early Sunni political *fiqh* (jurisprudence), Caliph (*Khalifa*) was considered as the successor of the Prophet and supreme leader of the *Umma* (the community of Muslims). As the ruler of *Umma*, the caliph not only was considered as a religious leader (with the functions such as leading the communal prayers or collecting religious taxes) but also he exercised the temporal roles of the Prophet.[72]

By contrast, pre-Islamic Persian tradition of statecraft had a different perspective about the relation between politics and religion. *Name-ye Tansar*

(Letter of Tansar), a pre-Islamic Sassanid *Andarz*, illustrates the relations between religion and state:

> Do not be surprised that I enthusiastically consider the welfare of the mundane world a prerequisite for the sustenance of the religious conjunctions. Religion and state are born twins. They will never be separated.[73]

Similar notion was repeated in another pre-Islamic Sassanid text *Ahd-e Ardeshir* (*Ardeshir's Testament*):

> Religion and kingship are two brothers, and neither can dispense with the other. Religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship protects religion, for whatever lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears.[74]

In the Sassanid Empire, Zoroastrianism was the most widespread religion and had the greatest number of believers. The first Sassanid king of kings Ardeshir (226-241 CE) had a family with a Zoroastrian priesthood background and his counselor Tansar supported and strengthened the Zoroastrian orthodoxy. Sassanid dynasty considered themselves as the successors of Achaemenid kings. For the unification of empire, Zoroastrianism could play the role of the state religion. However, the King and royal family were not seen as being (high) priests; yet they fully supported Zoroastrianism. *Mobedan* (Zoroastrian priests) had a high status at the court and in the empire. However, Sassanid kings possessed the temporal power and authority, and they tried to keep the balance between their power and *Mobedan* influence. Religion was also a source of conflict between the Christian Byzantine Empire and the Sassanid empire. The King of Kings of *Iranshahr* was responsible for the protection of Zoroastrianism.[75]

So, in pre-Islamic Persian royal tradition, there were two domains of power. In the first domain, *Shāhanshāh* had the temporal power and he was supported by God's grace. In the second domain, *Mobedan* had the spiritual authority, and they controlled the fire temples. However, the *Mobedan* had no right to intervene in temporal issues. *Shāhanshāh* should support the state religion, try to expand its reach, should respect the principles of religion and act as a faithful ruler. This notion of kingship is entirely different from political *fiqh*, which views the caliph as the successor of the prophet and his temporal and divine authority.

This pre-Islamic idea of kingship and religion became the central foundation of new hybrid Persian mirror for princes like *Siyāsat nāmeh*. This happened in the new context of Zoroastrianism being substituted by Sunni Islam, Sassanid *Shāhanshāh* with Turk Sultans and *Mobedan* with *Ulema*.

Ziyā Barani draws on these concepts and metaphors. Similar to the pre-Islamic Letter of Tansar, he repeatedly states: "Religion and state are born

twins".[76] However, Barani did not simply borrow the Sassanid idea but tried to develop it, according to the political context that emerged after the collapse of the caliphate. For the conceptualisation of relations between the state and religion, he articulated a hybrid narration, using Keyumarth, the mythological First Man in the Persian mythology and Seth, the biblical character and Adam's son. He introduced Keyumarth and Seth as twin brothers and stated that they were the first king and the first prophet respectively:

> As it was mentioned in the historical texts of previous nations, Seth (Sheys) and Keyumarth both were sons of Adam, and they were twin brothers. Based on God's comprehensive wisdom, he revealed to Adam and told him, "I will give the prophethood to Seth and his sons in order to guiding other Adam's children to the right way and making them deserving for the heaven and saving them from the hell. [In addition], Keyumarth and his sons in the territory of domination, justice, and beneficence should live with other Adam's children. [Keyumarth and his sons] are responsible for worldly affairs and they make the world habitable for Adam's children."[77]

Accordingly, for the first time in Islamic political thought, Barani explicitly differentiates between prophethood and statecraft. *Dindāri* (practicing religion) and *Jahāndāri* (Statecraft or governance) are two keywords that Barani employed for highlighting this contrast. *Dindāri* is related to spiritual and divine realm and *Jahāndāri* deals with worldly affairs and temporal power:

> *Dindāri* is what Mohammad-ibn Abdullah Qureshi [The Prophet] did. Therefore, everyone that follows his way of life, speeches and practices are *Dindār*. *Jahāndāri* and statecraft are whatever Khosrow Parviz [a Sassanid *Shāhanshāh*] and his ancestors did in *Ajam* (Persia). Then, everybody who follows their way of life, speeches and practices can govern, and all the world obey him.[78]

Barani has a ground breaking new perspective on the distinction between state and religion that was not seen in *Siyāsat nāmeh* or other comparable mirrors for princes. He frankly talked about the difference between Mohammad's pious lifestyle and his pragmatist way of statecraft. According to Barani, Mohammad's miracle is that he as the prophet of God possessed both powers:

> Possessing of *Jamshidi*[79] and *Darvishi*[80] at the same time is the miracle of the prophet of Islam.

He interpreted the failure of the age of the rightly-guided caliphs (632-661 CE) as the result of inattention to necessities of *Jahāndāri* and what today we call 'realpolitik':

> After Mohammad, if Caliphs or Muslim kings want to follow the prophet's traditions and his way of style, the governing is impossible and they cannot even survive![81]

The distinction between the religious and political realm and their inevitable contradictions implies to a turning point in the history of political thought in both Islamic and *Ajam* geo-cultures. Considering the failure of Caliphate model, Ziyā Barani, with a realist perspective transcended the pre-Islamic Iranian notion of kingship to a more secular and realistic conceptualisation that can be compared with Kauṭilya and Machiavelli. Barani discussed the contradictions between statecraft – based on power, material factors and practical considerations – and religion with its idealist notions about morality or ethical premises. He concluded that:

> There is a complete conflict and clear contradiction between Mohammad's way of life and his tradition and Khosrow's way of life and kingship.[82]

Therefore, Muslim kings should follow the manner of '*Akasere-ye Ajam*' (Sassanid kings) and the following old rituals of the Sassanid court that can improve glory of kingdom if employed:

- To make golden crowns and thrones.
- To build castles and palaces.
- To gather treasures.
- To expand personal property.
- To wear silk clothing.
- To build new Harams.
- To punish others even if it is against *Sharia*.

That leaves us with puzzling questions: Why Barani recommended *Padishah-e-Islam* to oppress, intolerantly, Hinduism in India? Why had he an extreme enmity toward Brahmins as the *A'eme-ye-Kofr* (Leaders of Infidelity)? The main answer can be found in the pre-Islamic notion of kingship. A Sassanid *Shāhanshāh* should support the state religion of the empire – that was one of his principal duties. As elaborated above, this notion flowed into the Islamic context with appropriations and modifications. Sunni Islam for the Sunni Turkish Sultan had the same place as Zoroastrianism for the Persian *Shāhanshāh*. That is why Barani several times asked *Padishah-e-Islam* to enforce *Sharia* in Indian society, particularly *Qisas*, *Had*, *Tazir*, and appoint the stern *Muhtasibs* (religious police). Not only he took an extreme stand against Hindus, but also he advised kings to take a stand against Shia Muslims, philosophy scholars, and other non-Sunni Muslims.

Zawābet: State Law and Public Welfare

As was mentioned above, *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* cannot be considered as a mere replica of *Siyāsat nāmeh*. Due to the particular political and social context, Barani developed conceptual innovations in his political theory. However, as a

pragmatist Muslim political theorist, he realised that enforcing *Sharia* in a multifarious society with growing complexities collides with efficient statecraft. Therefore, Barani strongly emphasised the need for *Zawābet* (secular state laws) in addition to *Sharia*. He remained skeptical about the capability of the realm of *Dindāri* for resolving practical political problems and tried to solve the contradiction between religion and practical politics via differentiation of the two realms. He defined *Manfa'at-e halva Kheyr-e Ma'al* (current interest and final beneficence) as the first and foremost goal of *Jahāndāri* (statecraft or governance).[83] Barani defines *Zawābet* as:

> A rule of action which a king imposes as an obligatory duty on himself for realising goals of statecraft (the interest of the state), and he never deviates from them.[84]

Zawābet, principally, is made by the king. However, they should be implemented after consultation with wise and loyal counselors. Barani realised that *Sharia* was static, and Muslims needed rules of statecraft in response to the change of time and circumstance.[85]

Barani's definition of the goal of state cannot be found in the earlier Islamic political jurisprudence texts and can be only compared with the ancient Indian tradition of statecraft. Barani's idea of the purpose of state can be equated with Kauṭilya's notion of state and what Liebig describes as 'Kauṭilyan raison d'état'.[86] Moreover, *Zawābet* can be compared with the concept of *rājadharma* as it was understood by Kauṭilya. The concept implies that the principles of *dharma* are the base of state's authority. Thus, the fulfillment of king's duties and responsibilities – based on *rājadharma* – is the central factor for the stability of society and the happiness of the people.[87]

According to Barani, the king, and his government should follow the religious *Sharia*, but at the same time, they should obey the *Zawābet*, as the state's laws and regulations, in the name of '*istihsan*' (the public good or welfare). If these laws violated the *Sharia*, the principle of the necessity of '*istihsan*' (the public good) should be called upon in their favour.[88]

Zawābet should be based on four pre-conditions:

1. It should not violate the *Sharia* and the religion.
2. It should be congruent with the elites' interest and the aspirations of the masses. It should not be source of people's suffering.
3. Precedents or similarities with these rules should be found in the reign of earlier faithful kings.
4. If it was against *Sharia*, but its non-implementation would cause damage to the people, it can be adopted.

As a result, as Ahmad[89] indicates, Muslim rulers of both Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire (1526-1750 CE), were not mere executors of *Sharia*

law in India. As Barani formulated it, Muslim rulers adopted and implemented *Zawābet* that was secular in essence. Iqtidar Alam Khan states:

> That the Delhi Sultanate as well as the Mughal empire were far from being Islamic theocracies and actually carried within their state organisations many overtly secular features that are fully borne out by the observations of Barani and Abu al-Fazl on the problems of sovereignty.[90]

Conclusion

The subject of this study is political theory in the era of the Delhi Sultanate – specifically Ziyā Barani's political theory as articulated in his *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri*. The core objective of this study is to answer these three questions:

1. What are the essential elements of Barani's political thought?
2. Which political, cultural and social factors influenced *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* and Barani's political theory?
3. What is the influence of a) Islamic political ideas, b) pre-Islamic Iranian political ideas, and c) ancient Indian tradition of statecraft, as articulated by Kauṭilya, on Barani's political thought?

Regarding the first question, the political ideas of Barani are based on his distinction between '*Jahāndāri*' (Statecraft, literally means world-keeping) and '*Dindāri*' (practising religion). Barani's argumentation emphasises a clear distinction between state policy and personal, religion-derived morality. Therefore, for Barani, the unity of these two realms was possible only as a miracle with Prophet Mohammad. Thus, Islamic rulers should follow the Sassanid tradition of statecraft as the best way of '*Jahāndāri*'. Furthermore, the idea of *Zawābet* as state laws that are established by the king for the public good is another distinctive feature of Barani's political ideas.

Regarding the second question, the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate and the rise of questions of political legitimacy, political instability in the Delhi sultanate and the immigration of Persian speaking elites to Delhi are the objective factors that impacted the formation of Barani's political theory.

Finally, this study shows how Barani's political thought was influenced by pre-Islamic Sassanid tradition of statecraft. Moreover, his ideas can be seen as the continuity of Nezām al Molk's political thoughts and his *Siyāsat nāmeh*. Similar to pre-Islamic Iranian political ideas, he introduced king as the 'wonderful creation' who is God's deputy on the earth. Also, similar to the role of Sassanid kings for the protection of Zoroastrianism, the king of Islam should protect the official religion (Sunni Islam). However, his ideas cannot be seen as the mere copy of Persian political thought. *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* features innovative ideas like:

- The theoretical foundation of kingship.
- The theory of justice versus anarchy.
- The separation between the realms of state and religion.
- The necessity and importance of secular law.

As of now, there is no tangible evidence that Ziyā Barani had access to ancient Indian works on statecrafts such as Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* or similar Indian works. However, the *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* does contain thought-figures that appear homologous with ideas in the *Arthaśāstra*. Thus, it can be stated that the *Fatāwā-ye jahāndāri* is a hybrid text with Islamic, pre-Islamic Persian and ancient Indian thought-components. Research digging deeper into the latter idea-component is a desideratum.

END NOTES

Note: For the transliteration of Persian words, the author has followed the 'Iranian Studies scheme'.

1. cf. Auer (2015), Jauhri (2001), Kolff (2008), Moosvi (2009), Singh (2008).
2. Mehta (2009: 15).
3. Barani (1862).
4. Bulliet et al. (2012).
5. Habib (1999: 24).
6. Sarkar (2006: 327).
7. Varma (1986: 218-220).
8. Black (2011: 166).
9. Khan (1986: 5).
10. Alam (2000: 220).
11. Roy and Alam (2011: 30).
12. Habibullah (1941: 210-211).
13. A.S. Khan in Barani (1972: 3).
14. Barani (1972: 2).
15. Hardy (1978: 127).
16. Alam (2004: 31).
17. Syros (2012: 545).
18. Habib (1999: 20).
19. Hardy (1988).
20. Mehta (2009: 15).
21. Habib (1999: 20), Hardy (1988).
22. Barani (1862: 350).
23. Habib (1981: 307).
24. cf. Barani (1938: 71).
25. Habib (1981: 59).
26. Alam et al. (2000: 23).
27. Chopra (2012: 31).

28. Alam (2003: 133).
29. Alam et al. (2000: 24).
30. Gould (2015: 91).
31. *Ibid.*: 92.
32. Alam (2003: 134).
33. Awfi (1982).
34. cf. Gould (2015).
35. Hendushāh-eAstarābādi (2008: 267-268).
36. Barani (1862: 66-67).
37. *Ibid.*: 352.
38. *Ibid.*: 352-353.
39. *Ibid.*: 9.
40. Habib (1999: 21).
41. Darling (2013: 223).
42. We do not delve here into the never-ending disputes among Indologists about the authorship and dating of *Arthaśāstra:* The first position expounds that Kauṭilya is the author of the *Arthaśāstra* and it was written at the end of fourth century BCE in India. Some other Sanskrit philologists claim that the *Arthaśāstra* is a compilation of multiple text components written by several (unknown) authors between the fourth century BCE and fifth century CE. cf. Liebig (2013: 101).
43. The Sassanid (Sassanian) Empire was the last pre-Islamic Persian empire, ruled by the Sassanian dynasty from 224 to 651 CE.
44. Luce (2010: 1916).
45. Haghighat (2012: 2).
46. Luce (2010: 1916).
47. Aquil (2008: 168).
48. Rosenthal (1958: 1-10).
49. Tabatabai (2006: 77).
50. Haghighat (2012: 3).
51. Tabatabai (2013: 115).
52. Tabatabai (2006, 2013).
53. Daryayi (2010: 41).
54. *Ibid.*: 42.
55. Katouzian (2003: 235).
56. cf. Ghiasabadi (2012).
57. Nizam al-Mulk (2002: 9).
58. Barani (1972: 3).
59. *Ibid.*: 88.
60. *Ibid.*: 147.
61. Makdisi (1970: 262).
62. March (2012: 113).
63. Barani (1862: 491-492).
64. Liebig (2014b: 4).
65. *Ibid.*: 5.
66. Barani (1972: 3).

67. *Ibid.*: 4.
68. *Ibid.*: 66.
69. *Ibid.*: 67.
70. cf. *Ibid.*: 68-69.
71. Gibbon (2003: 893).
72. Bosworth (1960: 948).
73. Quoted in Hunter (1998: 42-43).
74. Quoted in Lambton (2013: 41).
75. cf. Daryayi (2010), Tabatabai (2006).
76. Barani (1972: 333).
77. *Ibid.*: 333-334.
78. *Ibid.*: 140.
79. Jamshid is the mythological First King in the Persian mythology. cf. *ibid.*
80. Darvish is Persian word, meaning 'poor', literally. In the context of Sufism, it has been used in the same manner as the Arabic word "*Faqir*" to refer to Sufi holy men who have given up worldly life for a spiritual and devoted life. cf. *ibid.*
81. Barani (1972).
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*: 217-218.
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*: 219.
86. Liebig (2014b: 13).
87. Narayan (2004: 21).
88. Barani (1972: 217-223).
89. Ahmad (2009: 148).
90. Khan (1986: 4).